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OLD CHIEF, CROWDER, AND TRIALS BY STIPULATION
David Robinson, Jr.*
In this Article, Professor Robinson argues that the meaning of "un-
fair prejudice" and the scope of trial judges' discretion in employing
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is still uncertain following the
Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Old Chief and its
vacation and remand of United States v. Crowder and United States v.
Davis. Robinson evaluates the evidentiary implications of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions by discussing each case and analyzing the im-
plications of the three cases read together.
Professor Robinson examines the possible effects of stipulations and
admissions on the Rule 403 balancing test for exclusion of relevant evi-
dence, highlighting the distinctions of the stipulations in Old Chief as
compared to those in Crowder and Davis. In addition, he discusses the
appropriate role of emotionally laden evidence in trial processes. He
also ponders the scope of trial judges' discretion to exclude evidence
under Rule 403 after Old Chief, Crowder, and Davis. Finally, Professor
Robinson analyzes the possible interpretations of Old Chief, from a very
narrow reading to a very broad one, to conclude that read with Crowder
and Davis, the ruling in Old Chief was relatively conservative and will
likely be limited by the Court in future decisions to its specific facts or
to other cases involving legal status issues. As such, traditional practic-
es remain largely undisturbed.
Robinson notes that the Court articulated a cautious rationale for re-
versing the conviction in Old Chief and explains that far more sweeping
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change could have been effected if the court had applied differently the
definition of relevancy in Rule 401 or, alternatively, the balancing test of
Rule 403. Robinson concludes that Old Chief clearly means that trial
judges do not have unlimited discretion to decline to exclude evidence
under Rule 403 but that the extent of this limitation must await the clari-
fication of further decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As a theoretical matter, a rational evidence code could consist of a
definition of relevant evidence and a declaration that all relevant evi-
dence should be admitted unless its probative value is outweighed by its
various costs. All other provisions, with the exception of those relating to
privileges, could be regarded as merely illustrative of this general princi-
ple or even eliminated. The Federal Rules of Evidence are partly con-
structed on this model: The heart of the Rules is contained in the three
general relevancy provisions.' The problems that would be encountered
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvlD. 401. "All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided .... Evidence which is not rele-
vant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402. "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
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if the Rules were thus limited are related primarily to indeterminacy;
courts need more guidance than is provided by mere instructions to bal-
ance benefits against costs. The Rules therefore include provisions ad-
dressing conventional subsets of evidence law, such as hearsay,2 opin-
ion,3 impeachment of witnesses,4 authentication of documents,5 and the
like. Even the general balancing provision of the relevancy rules is sup-
plemented by more specific directives in a number of frequently recur-
ring contexts, such as the use of character evidence,6 compromise of-
fers,7 and liability insurance;8 yet, in general, the command that relevant
evidence should be admitted unless its benefit is clearly outweighed by
its disadvantages remains the underlying philosophy of the Rules.9 The
question then arises as to what is meant by the terms "probative value,"
"unfair prejudice," and "substantially outweighed."1 What are the re-
spective roles of trial and appellate courts in applying the Rules?
Broad discretion in the employment of Rule 403 by trial judges
seems both inevitable and desirable as indicated by its pervasive poten-
tial applicability, the indeterminacy of the balancing process authorized
by it and of the meaning of Rule 403's key terms, and its permissive
rather than mandatory text; yet the meaning of "unfair prejudice" and the
scope of that discretion have been placed in serious uncertainty following
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Old Chief v. United States" and
its vacating of United States v. Crowder" and United States v. Davis."
Despite the more sweeping possible implications of these decisions, the
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVM.
403.
2 See FED. R. EvID. 801-805.
' See id. 701-705.
4 See id. 607-610, 613.
5 See id. 901-902.
6 See id. 404.
7 See id. 408.
8 See id. 411.
9 An exception is Rule 609, which contains detailed provisions covering the im-
peachment of witnesses by evidence of conviction of a crime. The rule details instances
when such evidence may be used, and excludes supplemental Rule 403 balancing in this
context. See United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that district
courts have no discretion to weigh the probative value of some crimes against their
prejudicial effect).
10 See FED. R. EvID. 403.
1' 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).




WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Court has acted with such sensitivity and caution that traditional practic-
es remain largely undisturbed.
II. OLD CHIEF
Johnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a drunken fracas on the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana in which he fired a weapon at
Anthony Calf Looking.14 Because Old Chief had been convicted several
years earlier of a felonious assault causing serious bodily injury, he was
charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm,15 as
well as with new aggravated assault counts.16 Before trial, Old Chief of-
fered to stipulate that he previously had been convicted of a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and moved that
the government be precluded from offering any evidence disclosing the
name and character of the crime. 7 The prosecutor declined to accept
the stipulation." The trial judge honored the prosecutor's decision"
and the written judgment of conviction, showing the nature of the crime
and the penalty of imprisonment for five years, was received in evidence
at trial."0 Old Chief did not testify in his own defense.2 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld Old Chief's conviction without
issuing a published opinion.22 The Supreme Court nonetheless quoted
14 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.
IS "It shall be unlawful for any person--(1) who has been convicted in any court of,
a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to ... possess
in or affecting commerce, any firearm .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). This prohibi-
tion extends beyond persons who have been convicted of felonies to other classes of
individuals, including addicts, illegal aliens, persons convicted of misdemeanors of do-
mestic violence, and others. For simplicity, this Article will refer to this prohibition in
the context of the ex-felon component.
Antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, and other similar
crimes relating to the regulation of business practices are excluded from the definition
of crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, for the purposes
of the prohibition. See id. § 921(a)(20) (1994).
16 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.
17 See id. at 647-48.
18 See id. at 648.
19 See id
20 See id.
21 See id at 648 n.2.
2 See United States v. Old Chief, 56 F.3d 75 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded,
117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). The unpublished opinion is available in 1995 WL 325745 and
was ordered published as an attachment to an order remanding the case to the district
court following the decision of the Supreme Court. See United States v. Old Chief, 121
F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the Court of Appeals as follows: "Regardless of the defendant's offer to
stipulate, the government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense
through introduction of probative evidence .... Under Ninth Circuit law,
a stipulation is not proof, and, thus, it has no place in the FRE 403 bal-
ancing process. ' In United States v. Breitkreutz,24 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had stated:
The unwillingness of courts to force the prosecutor to accept
a criminal defendant's stipulation is based on the longstand-
ing rule that "the criminal accused cannot 'plead out' an
element of the charged offense by offering to stipulate to that
element."
... A stipulation is not proof. As we explained above,
it's a partial amendment to the defendant's plea, a means of
precluding any and all proof on a particular issue .... A
stipulation thus has no place in the Rule 403 balancing pro-
cess.2
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed Old Chief's con-
viction and remanded the case for further proceedings. 26
First, the Supreme Court rejected Old Chief's argument that the offer to
stipulate made the judgment of conviction irrelevant because the element of
his status as a convicted felon was no longer in issue.27 Relying on the
1972 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 401, the Court stated that to be
relevant,
[t]he fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in
dispute. While situations will arise which call for the exclu-
Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649 (quoting United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688,
690-92 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the government's right to refuse an offered stipula-
tion and to offer evidence of a prior offense)).
8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 690-92 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Right to "Plead Out" Issues
and Block the Administration of Prejudicial Evidence, 40 EMORY L.J. 341, 357 (1991)).
The sentence rejecting the application of Rule 403 surely constitutes a striking non
sequitur. A concurring opinion also rejected the applicability of Rule 403 balancing, but
on the alternative theory that the offer to stipulate made the government's proof of the
status of the defendant as a convicted felon totally irrelevant, drawing a distinction
between offers to stipulate as to the defendant's status and an offer to stipulate with
respect to the other elements of the crime charged. See id. at 693-95 (Norris, J., concur-
ring).
26 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656.
27 See id. at 649.
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sion of evidence offered to prove a point conceded by the
opponent, the ruling should be made on the basis of such
considerations as waste of time and undue prejudice (see
Rule 403), rather than under any general requirement that
evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in dis-
pute. 28
In addition, the Court stated that the conviction was relevant insofar as it
placed the defendant "within a particular sub-class of offenders for whom
firearms possession is outlawed by § 922(g)(1)."29 The Court then turned
to the question of whether receipt of the written judgment of conviction
violated Rule 403 by creating unfair prejudice against the defendant.3" In
holding that it did, the Court drew on the common law tradition, federally
codified in Rule 404(b),3 against proving a defendant's guilt by evidence
of his propensity to commit the crime charged.3 2 The danger that such evi-
dence will be used for this purpose is most acute when the prior offense is
similar to the one with which the defendant is charged, as it was in Old
Chief In accordance with the Advisory Committee's Notes, a trial court
should conduct Rule 403 balancing in the light of alternative avenues of
proof available to the prosecution. "[S]ound judicial discretion" would dis-
count the probative value of the written record of conviction because of the
availability of the stipulation, which presents less danger of jury misuse.33
Even though the stipulation offer was not accepted by the government at
trial, it constituted an offer of an admission that would have been "not
merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence of the element. " '
Significantly, the Court then proceeded to importantly qualify the fore-
going by recognizing that, in general, a defendant is not entitled to "stipulate
or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the govern-
ment chooses to present it,"'35 and that
making a case with testimony and tangible things not only
satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a color-
Id. at 649-50 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee's Note).
29 Id. at 649.
30 See id.
31 "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes...." FED. R. EVID.
404(b).
32 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 653.
35 Id.
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ful story with descriptive richness. Unlike an abstract prem-
ise, whose force depends on going precisely to a particular
step in a course of reasoning, a piece of evidence may ad-
dress any number of separate elements, striking hard just
because it shows so much at once; the account of a shooting
that establishes capacity and causation may tell just as much
about the triggerman's motive and intent. Evidence thus has
force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its
pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with
power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they
may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict. This persua-
sive power of the concrete and particular is often essential to
the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law
places on them. Jury duty is usually unsought and sometimes
resisted, and it may be as difficult for one juror suddenly to
face the findings that can send another human being to pris-
on, as it is for another to hold out conscientiously for acquit-
tal. When a juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary
account of what a defendant has thought and done can ac-
complish what no set of abstract statements ever could, not
just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance,
and so to implicate the law's moral underpinnings and a
juror's obligation to sit in judgment. Thus, the prosecution
may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors, as
much to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference
of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be
morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete ele-
ments of a defendant's legal fault.36
The Court further reasoned that there was a need for the trial to satisfy the
jurors' expectations that a case involving a charge of gun use ordinarily
would include the introduction of the gun or an explanation of the failure to
do so." A stipulation or admission in lieu of such proof may have led to a
negative inference adverse to the government.3"
In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to
prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate
the evidence away rests on good sense. A syllogism is not a
story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no
36 Id. at 653-54.
37 See id. at 654.
31 See id.
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match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove
it .... [J]urors asked to rest a momentous decision on the
story's truth can feel put upon-at being asked to take respon-
sibility knowing that more could be said than they have
heard. A convincing tale can be told with economy, but
when economy becomes a break in the natural sequence of
narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing link is
really there is never more than second best. 9
The Court, however, stated that these arguments for narrative complete-
ness and evidentiary robustness have no applicability to the status of the
accused, because Congress in enacting the prohibition generally applied it to
almost all convicted felons, and the sequence of events of the crime charged
would not be made partial or incomprehensible by not identifying the crime
of which the accused had been convicted.4" The only choice was between
the risk of prejudice attendant upon receipt of the written judgment of con-
viction and its complete absence in utilizing the stipulation;4' therefore,
"the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did
substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of con-
viction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an ad-
mission was available."42 The Court reversed the judgment of conviction
and remanded the case for determination of whether the error was harm-
less.43
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas, dissented. The dissenting Justices suggested that the prejudice
to Old Chief created by identifying the nature of his prior conviction was
not "unfair," because the government was required to prove the defendant's
status beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden that was not removed by the
stipulation.44 This was doubly true in Old Chief, both because the govern-
ment did not join in the stipulation and because, even had it done so, the
jury could not have been required to accept it.45 Fundamentally, the dis-
senters argued, the majority had created a partial plea of guilty and the
39 Id.
o See id. at 655. The Court also expressly limited its holding to cases involving
proof of felon status. See id. at 651 n.7.
"' See id at 655.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 656 n.11. The Court of Appeals in turn remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether the error was harmless. See United States v. Old
Chief, 121 F.3d 448, 448 (9th Cir. 1997). On September 24, 1997, the district court
found the error not harmless and ordered a new trial. United States v. Old Chief, D.C.
No. Cr-94-03-GF-DWM (D. Mont. Sept. 24, 1997).
See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41 See id. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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waiver of a right to a jury trial in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.46 Furthermore, the need of the government to present a case
with narrative completeness included a need to explain to the jury the nature
of the prior offense.47 In the eyes of the dissenters, the majority had re-
treated from the "fundamental principle that in a criminal prosecution the
Government may prove its case as it sees fit," and the defendant's remedy
should be an instruction limiting the jury's use of the evidence to an appro-
priate one, as was given in this case.48
III. UNITED STATES V. CROWDER AND UNITED STATES V. DAVIS
Two weeks following its reversal of the conviction in Old Chief, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Crowder49 granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment upsetting the conviction of the defendant, and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of Old Chief. Crowder was charged with
possession of drugs with intent to distribute." Police officers observed
Crowder exchanging a small object with a man for cash.51 Upon seeing the
officers, Crowder fled, dropping a paper bag with ninety-three bags of crack
cocaine and thirty-eight packets of heroin. 2 He was quickly apprehended
and found to be in possession of $988 in cash and a beeper.53 The defense
argued that Crowder had not possessed the drugs and that the police framed
him for refusing to cooperate in a murder investigation.54 The government
offered evidence that Crowder had sold drugs to an undercover officer on
another occasion.55 Crowder objected and offered to concede every element
of the crime except his possession of drugs on the date charged.56 The dis-
trict court nonetheless admitted the evidence to show intent to distribute and
"knowledge of drug dealing."57 The court of appeals reviewed the sharply
46 The opinion refers to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which requires government consent to the waiver of a jury trial. See id. at 660
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). That provision, however, is clearly
directed at total waiver. The dissent might more appropriately also have cited Rule 12
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which limits defensive pleas to not guilty,
guilty, and nolo contendere, and explicitly abolishes all other pleas. See FED. R. GRIM.
P. 12.
4' See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 658.
49 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
50 United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated







17 Id. at 1409. Crowder's stipulation did not include the latter, which is not an ele-
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conflicting decisions of nine other circuits.58 It concluded that those deci-
sions fell into three different categories: four circuits leave substantial dis-
cretion in the district courts to find that the probative value is not substan-
tially outweighed by danger of prejudice, notwithstanding the defendants'
offer to stipulate; two circuits find that such an offer "generally" makes
other evidence of intent and knowledge inadmissible; and three circuits give
defendants the right to remove such elements from the case.59 The District
Court of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Crowder decided to follow
the Second Circuit' by holding that a concession of the elements of
knowledge of the drugs and intent to distribute, together with the offer of an
explicit jury instruction that the government need not prove these elements,
removed these issues from the case, even without a formal offer to stipu-
late.6' The court held that proof of other crimes to show intent only tends
to show propensity to commit the crime charged, and therefore is prohibited
by Rule 404(b), and is error.62 The court vacated the conviction and re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the other crime
evidence was admissible to show knowledge of drug dealing and therefore
possession, strongly intimating that its probative value on this theory was
substantially outweighed by its tendency to prejudice and that therefore a
new trial should be conducted without such evidence.63
In United States v. Davis," consolidated on appeal with Crowder, the
defendant was also charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute. He claimed mistaken identity by an undercover officer and of-
fered to stipulate to both knowledge and intent by the actual offender (not
himself).65 The court of appeals held that the admission of evidence of oth-
er drug sales by Davis was reversible error and remanded the case for a new
trial.66 The Supreme Court vacated this decision, along with that in Crowd-
er, and remanded the case to the court of appeals to further consider it in
light of Old Chief.
ment of the crime.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 1409-10.
6 See United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 751-54 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the
government may not refuse an unequivocal offer to stipulate to a defendant's intent and
knowledge, and then introduce evidence of other crimes).
61 See Crowder, 87 F.3d at 1410.
62 See id.
See id. at 1413-14.
87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
61 See id. at 1408.
66 See id. at 1416.
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VACATION OF THE CONVICrIONS IN
CROWDER AND DAVIS
Supreme Court vacation orders are subject to varying interpretations. 67
On the one hand, in vacating Crowder and Davis, the Court did not explicit-
ly disapprove of the decisions of the court of appeals, as might have been
accomplished by writing at least a memorandum opinion, explaining it§
reasoning, or even by summary reversals of the court of appeals. 6 On the
other hand, unlike a denial of certiorari, the vacation and remand for recon-
sideration of the cases represent a decision, by a majority of the Justices,
that the intervening authority might properly have led, if it had been avail-
able, to a different result in the appeals.
In Henry v. City of Rock Hill,69 the defendants were convicted of a
breach of the peace in South Carolina. The convictions were affirmed on
appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
convictions, and remanded the cases for further consideration in the light of
another Supreme Court decision that term. The South Carolina Supreme
Court distinguished the case and upheld the conviction.7" The United States
Supreme Court again granted certiorari and reversed the convictions, stating:
The South Carolina Supreme Court correctly concluded
that our earlier remand did not amount to a final determina-
tion on the merits. That order did, however, indicate that we
found [the intervening case] sufficiently analogous and, per-
haps, decisive to compel re-examination of the case.
We now think [the intervening cases] control the result
here.71
While the vacation of Crowder and Davis for reconsideration inevitably
is ambiguous, it becomes less so when examined in light of the Court's
narrow holding in Old Chief. In Old Chief, the Court confined its ruling to
the admission of a status element of a crime and provided elaborate defer-
67 Professor Arthur D. Hellman has referred to orders vacating the judgment below
and remanding for reconsideration in light of intervening decisions as "[tihe most puz-
zling mode of disposition in the Supreme Court's repertory." Arthur D. Hellman, The
Supreme Court's Second Thoughts: Remands for Reconsideration and Denials of Re-
view in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 5 (1983).
" Summary reversals on the basis of an intervening case, fairly common in the
1960s, apparently are not used by the Supreme Court today. See id. at 8. A Westlaw
search of the decisions of the Supreme Court during the 13 years since the publication
of the Hellman article failed to locate any such cases.
69 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam).
70 See City of Rock Hill v. Henry, 135 S.E.2d 718 (S.C. 1963).
7' Henry, 376 U.S. at 777.
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ence to the government's legitimate interest in evidentiary depth and narra-
tive completeness, rather than abstract logic. Furthermore, the concessions of
the defense in Crowder and Davis were especially artificial: "I did not pos-
sess the drugs, but I nevertheless agree that whomever did so, knew the
nature of what was possessed and had an intent to distribute them." To
truncate the government's case upon waiving such a hypothetical and specu-
lative magic wand of admissions seems to be an abandonment of the "ac-
cepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any
defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away."72 Had the Court felt
otherwise, presumably it would have either affirmed the judgments of the
court of appeals or denied certiorari in Crowder and Davis, rather than
granting, vacating, and remanding.73
After the vacation and remand of Crowder and Davis, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit repudiated its previous
positions and affirmed the convictions of the defendants. It noted that in Old
Chief, the Supreme Court had limited its decision to status elements of an
offense, and the Court of Appeals held that with respect to other elements,
such as knowledge and intent, the government is not precluded from reject-
ing a defense offer to stipulate and instead introducing evidence of bad acts
to prove intent.74
V. THE APPROPRIATE USE OF EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED'S BAD
CHARACTER
The black-letter law of evidence has long denied the prosecution the use
of evidence of the accused's criminal propensity solely to prove the crime
charged, unless the accused has opened the door to the inquiry by introduc-
ing evidence of good character.75 Such evidence commonly is thought to
present a paradigmatic example of probative value being outweighed by
dangers of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, excessive consumption of
time, and unfair surprise.76 Often, as expressed by Justice Jackson in his
72 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654. Indeed, a jury may conclude that such a concession
of the defense is attributable to the incompetence or disloyalty of defense counsel. See 1
HERBERT J. STERN, TRYING CASES TO WIN 48-49 (1991).
7' On the basis of an empirical study of all summary reconsideration orders entered
during three Supreme Court terms in the late 1970s, Professor Hellman concluded that
"when the lower court's judgment appeared on the surface to be consistent with the new
precedent, the Court almost invariably denied review rather than remanding." Hellman,
supra, note 67, at 16.
74 United States v. Crowder, No. 92-3133 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 1998) (en banc)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, 8345).
71 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The leading case is Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469 (1948), which was quoted with approval in Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650-51.
76 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76; see also 1 MCCORMICK
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wonderfully lucid opinion in Michelson v. United States, the stated rationale
focuses on a fear that jurors will overvalue such evidence.7 In addition,
there is concern that the disclosure of bad character may reduce the
prosecution's burden of persuasion, as the trier of fact may conclude that the
accused should be convicted irrespective of his guilt, or at least, that the
trier of fact should not much regret (and therefore discount) the danger that
the accused is not guilty of the crime charged.78
Notwithstanding the ostensible verbal consensus on the propensity rule,
the application of the rule in practice is far more ambiguous. First, the pro-
hibition is inapplicable when evidence is offered for a purpose other than
that of showing character or propensity. As stated in Federal Rule 404(b),
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident ....
These numerous permissible purposes, which are illustrative and not exhaus-
tive, frequently provide an opportunity for the trier of fact to obtain spill-
over propensity evidence."0 Old Chief itself provides an example. The join-
ing of an ex-felon in possession of a firearm count to a felonious assault
count resulted in the jury being informed that Old Chief was a convicted
felon.81 "Intent," to take another example, is almost invariably an element
of a crime.82 To routinely permit use of evidence of other crimes to prove
ON EVIDENCE § 190 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
7 See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 469; see also Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Rele-
vance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1977) (noting the "estimation problem" of jurors
according evidence more weight than it deserves).
78 See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 218 (2d ed. 1982).
'9 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
o "The common law rule has been described as 'an unctuous, but easily circumvent-
ed rule of exclusion."' 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5239, at 428 (1978) (citing M.C. Slough, Other
Vices, Other Crimes: An Evidentiary Dilemma, 20 U. KAN. L. REV. 411 (1972)); see
also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Miscon-
duct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evi-
dence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 593 (1990) (contending that the legal means
of using past crimes of the defendant to prove intent has risked rendering the character
prohibition useless).
s' See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647-48.
82 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.8(a) (1986)
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intent would largely eviscerate the character evidence prohibition.
A second permissible method of avoiding the propensity rule is offering
evidence of other crimes for impeachment of the accused if he elects to take
the witness stand.83 Although the accused is entitled to an instruction that
such evidence is to be considered only in terms of assessing his credibility
as a witness, a more realistic rationale for the applicable rules may be an
assumed frequent perjury by defendants in criminal cases and a need to
"fight fire with fire" by allowing the prosecution to respond with evidence
that is likely to be considered by the jury on a propensity basis.' A guilty
defendant in a felony case has a strong incentive to take the witness stand
and attempt to gain an acquittal by perjuring himself.' It is doubtful
whether offering prior convictions into evidence substantially aids in im-
peaching a defendant, other than by suggesting criminal propensity, guilt,
and, therefore, perjury.86 While juries are instructed not to consider convic-
tions received in evidence for impeachment as evidence of a defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime charged, the efficacy of such a direction
commonly is doubted. Professor Michael Graham, for example, has con-
cluded that "it is rarely seriously asserted that the trier of fact is fully capa-
ble much less interested in making such a distinction." 8
A third area in which the law often tolerates evidence of character to
prove criminal conduct is that of sex crimes. McCormick states the tradi-
tional doctrine as follows:
[E]xamination is in order of the principle purposes for which
the prosecution may introduce evidence of a defendant's bad
character .... The permissible purposes include:
(4) To show a passion or propensity for unusual and abnor-
mal sexual relations. Initially, proof of other sex crimes
(explaining that even in the absence of specific language indicating that fault is a nec-
essary element, the courts often impose an intent requirement).
83 See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
8 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966) (re-
porting a statistical study indicating the strong effect that evidence of prior convictions
has on juries' decisions to convict); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evi-
dence: PsychoBayesian Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 644
(1991) (identifying the need for a better method of character impeachment).
5 See Friedman, supra note 84, at 658.
86 See id.; but cf United States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the decision by the Supreme Court in Old Chief was inapplicable to evidence of crimes
received for impeachment purposes, even where the defendant's prior offenses were
assaultive ones similar to the crimes charged).
8 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 1 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 759-60 (1996).
88 Id. at 760.
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always was confined to offenses involving the same parties,
but a number of jurisdictions now admit other sex offenses
with other persons, at least as to offenses involving sexual
aberrations.8 9
This permissible use of propensity evidence apparently has been expand-
ed greatly on the federal level under the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 0 now codified in Rules 413 to 415 of the Feder-
al Rules of Evidence. 91 Under these rules, evidence of other crimes of sex-
ual assault or child molestation in civil or criminal cases "is admissible, and
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." 92
Examples'such as the foregoing indicate that the law of evidence toler-
ates a considerable amount of bad character evidence to show new miscon-
duct, notwithstanding its hesitation to do so when bad character evidence is
offered only for the purpose of proving new bad action.
VI. ON THE MEANING OF "UNFAIR PREJUDICE"
Of course, "unfair prejudice" cannot properly be interpreted to refer to
all evidence that is harmful to the case of a party; such a construction would
be inconsistent with the requirement that evidence be relevant. Rule 403
requires the balancing of probative value against prejudice only if the latter
is "unfair." 93 Rule 403 was approved by Congress without change, and it
has not been amended since its initial approval.94 The Advisory
Committee's Note gives only slight assistance to its interpretation. A single
sentence is devoted to defining "unfair prejudice": "'Unfair prejudice' within
its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
89 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 76, § 190, at 799, 803-04 (footnotes
omitted).
9 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (1994). On the one hand, these new
rules apparently are subject to Rule 403 balancing. This arguably may result in their
being rarely employed, as similar calculations underlay the common law doctrine that
they ostensibly displace. On the other hand, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel,
relying on the statements of congressional sponsors, interpreted Rule 414 as represent-
ing a congressional conclusion that the probative value of such evidence typically is not
substantially outweighed by its tendency to prejudice. See United States v. Larson, 112
F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997).
91 See FED. R. EvID. 413-15.
FED. R. EvID. 413(a), 414(a).
93 FED. R. EvID. 403.
See id. 403; see also 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403 App.01[3], at 2 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d
ed. 1997).
1998]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."'95 At least
three categories of appropriate concern are apparent. First, unfair prejudice
may be created by evidence that is so likely to elicit an intense emotional
response (such as anger, horror, or disgust) as to detract from the truth-seek-
ing function of the trial.96 Second, such prejudice may result from evidence
that seems likely to encourage a decision on an incorrect basis (such as the
conclusion that the accused is a dangerous person and should be put away
irrespective of his guilt of the crime charged).97 Third, unfair prejudice may
be created by evidence likely to be overvalued by the trier of fact in assess-
ing its probative force.98
9 56 F.R.D. 183, 218 (1972) (Advisory Committee's Note).
See, for example, United States v. Blackstone, 56 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1995), in
which evidence of possession of metamphetamine recipes, together with expert testimo-
ny linking possession of firearms with the manufacture of methamphetamine, was held
unduly prejudicial in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court
found this evidence particularly prejudicial because it connected the defendant with the
"highly charged public issue" of narcotics. Id. at 1146 (citation omitted). But see United
States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1986) (affirming a conviction in a pros-
ecution for activities relating to the sexual exploitation of minors, in which there was
admitted into evidence hard-core child pornography films and a similar brochure, de-
spite a stipulation of the parties that this was the character of the films and brochure
and the possibility that such items would have a highly negative effect on the jury). A
memorable state court case is People v. Cavanaugh, 282 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1955), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 950 (1956), a capital murder case in which three fingers, prints of which
had been used by the pathologist to identify the deceased, were severed from the body
and introduced in evidence at trial. The California Supreme Court, over the dissents of
Justices Traynor and Carter, declared this erroneous because it was unnecessary and
prejudicial, but held that there was no reversible error. See id. at 62.
' The evidence identifying Old Chief as guilty of a prior felonious assault provides
an example. See Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). In United States v.
Church, 955 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Coppola v. United
States, 506 U.S. 881 (1992), RICO and RICO-conspiracy convictions were upheld de-
spite the admission in evidence of a taped conversation of one defendant concerning
how to find a person to kill a prosecutor. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the taped conversation in evi-
dence, notwithstanding the government's argument that it was relevant to show "will-
ingness to use violence." Id. at 702-03. The court, however, found the admission of the
evidence to be harmless error. See id. at 703.
9 The classic statement is that of Justice Jackson in Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (footnotes omitted):
The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is
said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge
one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its
admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to
prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
Professors Lempert and Saltzburg have gone further and make an unusual conten-
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Unfair prejudice cannot properly be interpreted to rule out all evidence
that carries a likelihood of an emotional response by the trier of fact.99 As
the Court in Old Chief recognized, jurors must make difficult moral judg-
ments, not merely logical ones."°
Although this is rather elaborately conceded by the Court in Old Chief,
the majority opinion nevertheless proceeds, in part, in a narrowly logical
manner to decide that the receipt of the judgment of felony conviction was
error.
101
[T]here is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary
significance of an admission and of the legitimately proba-
tive component of the official record the prosecution would
prefer to place in evidence. For purposes of the Rule 403
weighing of the probative against the prejudicial, the func-
tions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only by
the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the oth-
er. In this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction
is for an offense likely to support conviction on some im-
proper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the
risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the dis-
counted probative value of. the record of conviction, and it
was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an ad-
mission was available.c 2
Of course, an admission by the defense does permit a court to properly
"discount" the probative value of additional evidence directed to the same
point. The problem, however, is not solely one of formal logic; it also is one
of satisfying a jury. A defendant's ex-felon status is so central to a federal
firearm possession charge that a jury understandably may expect to receive
more than an abstract statement by the judge that there has been an admis-
tion: Noting the tendency of police to investigate and charge those who already have
criminal records, and the greater likelihood of defendants who are innocent to stand trial
rather than plead guilty, they conclude that "the existence of a record may have no
association, or indeed a negative association with the probability of guilt." LEMPERT &
SALTZBURG, supra note 78, at 216-17.
99 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653-54.
" See id. at 644; see also supra text accompanying notes 33-42. Compare the obser-
vation of Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority in a previous decision of the Court:
"It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence are
framed. They have their source very often in considerations of administrative conve-
nience, of practical expediency, and not in rules of logic." Shepard v. United States,
290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
101 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
102 Id.
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sion of the point. Despite an accompanying instruction, a jury still might be
left with confusion and doubt as to the justice of the prosecution's case."3
In conducting Rule 403 balancing, courts must make quick, conjectural
estimations of the impact of items of evidence, their probative value, and
their tendency to result in unfair prejudice. Furthermore, little opportunity
exists for empirical confirmations of judicial hunches. Judges are not permit-
ted to invade the privacy of jury rooms to attempt to determine what influ-
ences jurors' decisions and in what way. An available empirical study does
not inspire confidence in judges' ability to accurately evaluate the effect of
particular pieces of evidence upon the decisions of juries,"° a difficulty
that doubtlessly continues to be magnified by the increasing diversity of jury
members."
Although they arose in the context of the cruel and unusual punishment
proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, the victim impact
cases involving the death penalty present strikingly similar considerations. In
1987, in a case involving execution-type double murders of an elderly cou-
103 See Lempert, supra note 77, at 1046-48. Lempert identifies two types of cases in
which redundant evidence might be appropriate: First, "where it is possible that the jury
does not appreciate fully the information conveyed by the first item of evidence," id. at
1046, and second, "where the jury expects that the evidence will be produced if it ex-
ists," id. at 1047.
104 See Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can
Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147
(discussing a statistical analysis testing the validity of the notion that judges can predict
how evidence will affect a jury).
"' Mark Cammack reported that empirical studies indicate the powerful effect of
prior experiences of jurors in their construction of what took place in a litigated event.
See Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 463-84
(1995). One such example is that white and nonwhite people tend to vary sharply in
their willingness to believe police testimony. See id; see also David Robinson, Jr., The
Shift of Balance of Advantage in Criminal Litigation: The Case of Mr. Simpson, 30
AKRON L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1996) (noting that pretrial polling data revealed widely differ-
ent initial predispositions of classes of potential jurors, depending on race and sex, a
difference indicated in the differing verdicts in the O.J. Simpson criminal and civil
cases); Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, NEW YORKER, Feb. 24, 1997, at 54, 55 (con-
cluding that an increasing number of District of Columbia criminal trials are resulting in
hung juries because of black female contrarians: "Some of these women have had espe-
cially searing experiences with the police; some are eccentric or disengaged; some are
overcome by religious beliefs; some are incapable of understanding the evidence; some
refuse to send another young black man to jail"); cf. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 80 § 5215 ("A jury of gunowners is less likely to be prejudiced by the evidence
that the defendant possessed a weapon than is a jury of persons who do not keep guns
in their homes."). But cf Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain't Broke .... 19 AM.
LAW., June 1997, at 5 (concluding that the best statistical evidence shows merely that
jurors of different races and backgrounds may weigh evidence differently, which may
affect acquittal rates but does not necessarily reflect jury nullification).
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pie in their home, the Court held that reception of the victims' family's
characterizations of the crimes and of their devastating effect on the family
was impermissible, because it was prejudicial and irrelevant to the
defendant's personal culpability."
One can understand the grief and anger of the family
caused by the brutal murders in this case, and there is no
doubt that jurors generally are aware of these feelings. But
the formal presentation of this information by the State can
serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it
from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning
the crime and the defendant. As we have" noted, any decision
to impose the death sentence must "be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." The admis-
sion of these emotionally charged opinions as to what con-
clusions the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is
inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we require in
capital cases."°
Four years later, this decision was overruled."°
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude
that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral
culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at
the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by
the defendant .... Booth deprives the State of the full moral
force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having
before it all the information necessary to determine the prop-
er punishment for a first-degree murder."°
,o See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (holding that the statutory require-
ment that a victim impact statement be presented to the jury was irrelevant to the sen-
tencing decision, and that such a requirement is unconstitutional because it violates the
Eighth Amendment), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a jury from considering victim impact
statements).
'07 Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358
(1977)).
" Payne, 501 U.S. at 808. Unlike the trial in Booth, which included evidence of the
effect of the homicides on surviving members of the family and opinions of the survi-
vors about the degree of heinousness of the defendant's conduct, the trial in Payne
included only the former, and the holding was expressly limited to such evidence. See
id. at 830 n.2.
109 Id. at 825.
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Professor Paul Gewirtz has observed:
[T]he glib distinction between "reasoned" and "emotional"
responses is far too simplistic. This insight dates back at
least to Plato. But more recently, scholars from fields as
diverse as philosophy, psychology, and neuirobiology have
demonstrated that emotions have a cognitive dimension and
are connected to beliefs in various respects. For example,
emotions can open up ways of knowing and seeing and can
therefore contribute to reasoning. (Fear and caring, for exam-
ple, can make us attentive to more facts; sympathy may be
part of properly assessing mitigation evidence in capital
sentencing). Indeed, reasons are constituted in part by emo-
tion, and are modifiable by emotion.
This is not at all to deny that emotion can be a problem
in the courtroom, but rather to affirm that it is inescapable
and has an appropriate place. One should grant that emotion
must be bounded if the court is to remain a place of law. But
the issue is boundedness, not whether emotion has a
place.11°
Furthermore, triers of fact approach the task of evaluating evidence with
more than reason and emotion. They also apply presuppositions, cognitive
filters, and strategies to the often-conflicting evidence presented at trial. A
substantial psychological and legal literature has addressed the issue of sche-
matic information processing. 1' Jurors and judges are not electronic tape
110 Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal
Trial, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAw 135, 145 (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (footnotes omitted); see Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know
It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1044 (1996) ("It is clear, I hope, what my main
point is: Law is not all reasoning and analysis-it is also emotion and judgment and
intuition and rhetoric. It includes knowledge that cannot always be explained, but that is
no less valid for that."); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1996):
To introduce the two sides in a highly schematic way, we may say that the
mechanistic view holds that emotions are forces more or less devoid of thought or
perception-that they are impulses or surges that lead the person to action without
embodying beliefs, or any way of seeing the world that can be assessed as correct
or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate. The evaluative view holds, by contrast,
that emotions do embody beliefs and ways of seeing, which include appraisals or
evaluations of the importance or significance of objects and events. These apprais-
als can, in turn, be evaluated for their appropriateness or inappropriateness.
III See, e.g., Cammack, supra, note 105, at 463 & n.335; Albert J. Moore, Trial by
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recorders of information, to be rewound, reviewed, and evaluated at the end
of a trial when a case is submitted for decision." 2 Thus, for example, the
words "school," "policeman," and "robbery" inevitably call forth varied
images and meanings to different people, depending on their life experienc-
es. This results in presuppositions of thinking-mental templates, sometimes
called "schemas.. ' ..3 These become devices for filling in factual assump-
tions, even though not reflected in evidence at trial, and filtering out (disre-
garding or rejecting) evidence--even if uncontradicted-that was received at
trial if the evidence is inconsistent with prior schemas." 4 The consequence
of these and other psychological phenomena are processes that vary, in a
variety of respects, from a rationalistic conception of evidence assessment in
a variety of respects, including insensitivity to probabilities and a relative
disregard of abstract, as compared to concrete, types of evidence."5 Sim-
ply informing a jury that the accused has been convicted of a felony there-
fore may be significantly less meaningful than receiving the judgment into
evidence and reading it, in full, to the jury. The use of a stipulation or ad-
mission, even if coupled with an instruction, may be filtered out by a lay
juror as meaninglessly abstract or as inconsistent with what the juror views
as significant, based on his own life experiences. To authorize similar sub-
stitutions of defense concessions, together with an instruction, for more con-
crete evidence of mens rea in cases like Crowder and Davis is to risk even
greater rejection by juries.
Public perceptions of the administration of law are disproportionately af-
fected by publicized cases. To the extent that probative evidence is kept
from the jury, and the jury acquits, there is the possibility that the public
interpretation of the event-based on the richer account of the case available
Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989). For general
discussion, see ROBERT S. FELDMAN, UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY 235-38 (1987);
SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION passim (2d. ed. 1991);
RONALD E. SMmTH, PSYCHOLOGY 311-28 (1993); William F. Brewer & Glenn V.
Nakamura, The Nature and Functions of Schema, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNI-
TION ch. 4 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1984); Steven J. Sherman &
Eric Corty, Cognitive Heuristics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra, at ch.
6.
112 Cf 1 EDWARD J. DEVITr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 10.01 (4th ed. 1992) ("It is important that you keep an open mind and not decide any
issue in the case until the entire case has been submitted to you and you have received
the final instructions of the court regarding the law which you must apply to the evi-
dence.").
113 "A schema may be defined as a cognitive structure that represents knowledge
about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among
those attributes." FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 111, at 98 (citations omitted).
114 See Moore, supra note 111, at 279-80.
115 See id. at 285-90.
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to it than to the jury---can dilute the moral message of the law. Professor
Charles Nesson has contrasted two different meanings of verdicts:
A verdict that a defendant is guilty or liable can carry
two different meanings and project two different rules. The
verdict can articulate a legal rule: "You did the thing en-
joined by the law; therefore, you will pay the penalty." This
message encourages each of us to conform our conduct to
the behavioral norms embodied in the substantive law. Alter-
natively, the verdict can emphasize a proof rule: "We will
convict and punish you only if your violation is proved by
due process of law." This message invites people to act not
according to what they know is lawful, but according to
what they think can be proved against them ....
Successful projection of a legal rule depends on a court's
ability to cast a verdict not as a statement about the evidence
presented at trial, but as a statement about a past act-a
statement about what happened."6
The point easily can be overstated. The moral message of the law also can
be diluted by intemperate verdicts encouraged by inflammatory evidence,
yet the general trend of the twentieth-century law of evidence, reflected in
the Federal Rules, has been one that increasingly trusts juries with relatively
more complete accounts of the events being litigated.
In addition to its eloquent general tributes to richness in evidentiary
presentation and the need for narrative completeness, the Court in Old Chief
made the observation that a conviction may be so old or so marginally relat-
ed to the fear of violence behind the criminalization of possession of a gun
by a felon that evidence of the nature of the prior crime may not be prejudi-
cial to the defendant, and even may unfairly prejudice the government. "7
In the latter case, the Court observed that because the defendant could not
be compelled to admit to the prior conviction, the government would be
faced with the risk of jury nullification."' This might encourage the prose-
cution to instead offer a redacted judgment of conviction with the name of
the crime deleted, although this would require an instruction that the offense
was not one of the predicate prior crimes excluded from the gun prohibi-
116 Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accept-
ability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357-58 (1985) (footnote omitted).
"' See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652 n.8.
118 See id.
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tion." 9 The Court stated that such an instruction would require the consent
of the defendant. 2
VII. THE SCOPE OF TRIAL COURT DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE PREJUDICIAL
EVIDENCE
The language of Rule 403, that a court may exclude evidence if its pro-
bative force is outweighed by its tendency to unfairly prejudice, explicitly
invites much discretion."' The rule's legislative history reinforces this
conclusion. The Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence divid-
ed Rule 403 as follows:
(a) EXCLUSION MANDATORY. Although relevant, evi-
dence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion
of the issues, or of misleading the jury.
(b) EXCLUSION DISCRETIONARY. Although relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
It would be an overstatement to conclude that the mandatory language in the
first proposed subdivision would have eliminated discretion, as varying
judicial findings with respect to "probative value," "substantially out-
weighed," and. "danger of unfair prejudice" unavoidably would have been
made and sustained in many situations. Still, the Preliminary Draft text
would have encouraged appeals by parties hoping to obtain different assess-
ments of the relative balance of the costs and benefits of excluding and
admitting items of evidence, as well as appellate reversals and new trials.
Furthermore, in criminal cases, trial judges averse to the risk of reversal
might systematically tend to err on the side of keeping out the prosecution's
evidence based on the government's inability to obtain review on appeal in
the event of acquittal. The Advisory Committee received a number of criti-
cisms of its effort to limit discretion in paragraph (a) of the Preliminary
Draft, and in its Second Revised Draft of the Proposed Rules (November
1971), the bifurcation and the mandatory words were eliminated."2
119 See id. at 655 n.10.
12 See id.
121 See FED. R. EvID. 403 Advisory Committee's Note.
'2 46 F.R.D. 161, 225 (1969).
1 Some of the critical commentary with respect to the original draft is contained in
2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 94, § 403A, at 3-9. (The writer of the
present Article served as a consultant to the Department of Justice and was among the
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The draft thus became similar to its three primary influential precursors,
the Model Code of Evidence," the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence,"
and the California Evidence Code." The Model Code is particularly ex-
plicit in its emphasis of the trial court's broad discretion. 7 Both the text
of the rule" and its Comment emphasize the trial court's authority.'29
This language reflected the view of its reporter, Professor Edmund Morgan
of Harvard, who wrote: "The proposed Code leaves no room for doubt as to
the power of the trial judge. His historic role as master of the trial is re-
stored. He has complete control of the conduct of the trial .... Rule 303 is
the keystone of the arch .... "
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules is less emphatic than the Model Code, the
Uniform Rules, and the California Evidence Code. The word "discretion"
does not explicitly appear in the final form of the rule.13' While "may" is
retained, "may" itself is ambiguous. It sometimes means "can" in the sense
that the judge has authority to exclude the evidence but implying that the
evidence generally should not be admitted."' It sometimes means the
judge has wide discretion to rule either way. 33 Here, both meanings seem
plausible. The broad discretion of the trial court was strongly supported by
the 1984 decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. AbeL' 34 A wit-
ness for the defense was impeached by testimony that the witness and the
defendant were both members of a prison gang that was committed to perju-
critics). The Justice Department filed a report with the Senate Judiciary Committee,
opposing what it termed "an absolute standard of inadmissibility which would appear to
require reversal on appeal whenever an appellate court disagreed with the trial court's
exercise of discretion. It is generally recognized that this matter is best left to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge." 117 CONG. REC. S33,650 (Justice Department report).
'24 See MODEL CODE OF EVID. 303 (1942).
'2' See UNIF. R. OF EvID. 45 (1953) ("[T]he judge may in his discretion exclude evi-
dence ....").
126 See CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1995) (originally enacted in its current form as
Cobey-Song Evidence Act, 1965 Cal. Stat. 299 § 352) ("The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed . . .
127 See MODEL CODE OF EvID. 303 (1942).
128 See id. ("The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is outweighed .... ").
129 See id. cmt. ("The application of this rule should depend so completely upon the
circumstances of the particular case and be so entirely in the discretion of the trial
judge that a decision in one case should not be used as a precedent in another.").
130 Edmund M. Morgan, Foreward, to MODEL CODE OF EvID. 1, 13-14 (1942).
131 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
132 See Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1104-05 (1985).
133 See id.
13 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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ry, theft, and murder on each other's behalf.135 This, Abel argued, inter
alia, violated Rule 403 in that the prejudicial effect of this evidence out-
weighed its probative value. 136 A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the
trial judge's ruling in an opinion strongly emphasizing the broad scope of
his discretion:
A district court is accorded a wide discretion in deter-
mining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules.
Assessing the probative value of common membership in
any particular group, and weighing any factors counseling
against admissibility is a matter first for the district court's
sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 and ultimately, if
the evidence is admitted, for the trier of fact. 1
37
In a seminal article, Professor Maurice Rosenberg distinguished what he
termed "primary discretion" and "secondary discretion.' 131 In the former,
the trial court is free to make a choice among alternatives without
constraints.'39 In the latter, which is primarily addressed to appellate
courts, the decision of the trial judge is given "an unusual amount of insula-
tion from appellate revision. In this sense, discretion is a review-restraining
concept. It gives the trial judge a right to be wrong without incurring rever-
sal.' 14' This right, characteristically, is not unlimited. Judge Henry J.
Friendly noted a galaxy of meanings of "abuse of discretion," from almost
total deference to the trial judge to reversal whenever the appellate court
disagrees with him.'" Judge Friendly approved of varying standards of re-
view, depending on the reasons for granting trial court discretion in specific
situations, and consequently supported permitting varying degrees of discre-
tion in the trial judge. 42 In general, Judge Friendly's article reflects skepti-
135 See id. at 47-48.
136 See id. at 53.
137 Id. at 54.
138 Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above,
22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971).
131 See id This form of discretion is rare.
140 Id. at 637.
141 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754-64
(1982) (discussing various interpretations of the term "discretion").
142 Judge Friendly listed the following factors as favoring full appellate review: Ap-
pellate courts have more time to consider a question, see id at 757; they have the re-
sources of multiple-judge panels, see id.; collegial review tends to curtail decisions on
impermissible factors, even subconscious ones, see id.; and they can better further uni-
formity of decisions in like cases, see id. at 758. Among the factors favoring deference
to the trial court, Judge Friendly listed the latter's superior position to determine the
facts. See id. at 759. Furthermore, the exercise of discretion is often based on a multi-
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cism of the frequent determination of appellate courts that judgments below
should be upheld as within the discretion of the trial judge. In contrast,
Judge Jack Weinstein (perhaps, in part, reflecting his experience as a judge
of a trial court rather than of an appellate court) has emphasized the broad
authority of the trial judge:
Cases decided after the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence consistently recognize the trial court's consider-
able discretion in excluding of evidence [sic] .... The trial
judge is the person on the spot who has experienced all the
events and personalities, and his or her discretion must be
respected unless it has been abused.143
While this last sentence expresses a tautology, the thrust of the para-
graph as a whole encourages a large degree of deference.' A trial judge
might, for example, in the case of a felon in possession of a gun (absent the
decision in Old Chiej), allow a judgment of a felonious assault to be consid-
ered by a jury dominated by Western ranchers, while requiring redaction or
acceptance of a stipulation before a jury dominated by Eastern suburban-
ites."'
VIII. STIPULATIONS, ADMISSIONS, PLEAS
Prior to trial, counsel for Old Chief moved that the prosecution be for-
bidden from mentioning or offering evidence of the nature of the
defendant's prior felony conviction and "offered to 'solve the problem here
by stipulating, agreeing and requesting the Court to instruct the jury that he
has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
(1) year."" '46 Defense counsel also proposed that the jury be instructed that
the defendant had been so convicted and that, in effect, proof of that ele-
ment of the statute under which the charge had been brought had been satis-
fied.'47 The trial court's permitting the government to put on evidence of
the written judgment of conviction, which showed the nature of the prior
felony, was the basis of the ultimate reversal of the conviction.'48 The Su-
tude of factors not usefully addressed by a Procrustean rule. See id. at 760. Often the
error, if any is found, will be harmless, see id. at 761, and judicial efficiency may be
disserved by appellate reversal and retrial, see id. at 761-62.
143 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE supra note 94, § 403.03, at 403-27 to -28.
144 See id. at 403-27 to -30.
145 See Waltz, supra note 132, at 1110.
146 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 648 (quoting the appellate record).
147 See id.
148 See id. at 655.
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preme Court treated the proffered stipulation, in the absence of the govern-
ment joining in the stipulation, as an admission, citing Federal Rule
801(d)(2)(A). 49 That rule, however, is addressed to an out of court, evi-
dentiary admission receivable as an exclusion from the hearsay rule. 5 '
Like a pretrial confession, it would be subject to contradiction by other
evidence at trial, and it's acceptance would not be binding on the jury. Old
Chief, however, was proposing a judicial admission, which would given
binding effect. As McCormick stated:
Evidentiary admissions are to be distinguished from judicial
admissions. Judicial admissions are not evidence at all. Rath-
er, they are formal concessions in the pleadings in the case
or stipulations by a party or its counsel that have the effect
of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with
the need for proof of the fact. Thus, the judicial admission,
unless allowed by the court to be withdrawn, is conclusive in
the case, whereas the evidentiary admission is not conclusive
but is always subject to contradiction or explanation.'
Because a judicial admission may be the functional equivalent of a
pleading, the normal rule that a court may not direct a verdict against the
accused even as to a single issue in a criminal case may be inapplicable."5 2
In any event, Old Chief offered not only the concession of his prior felony
149 See id at 653.
150 See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 76, § 254, at 140-42.
151 Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted).
1.2 Cf FED. R. EviD. 201(g) ("In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct
the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court
shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed."). Suggested "pattern" jury instructions vary with respect to stipula-
tions. Compare DEVITT E7 AL., supra note 112, § 12.03, at 333 ("When the attorneys
on both sides stipulate or agree as to the existence of a fact, you may accept the stipula-
tion as evidence and regard that fact as proved. You are not required to do so, however,
since you are the sole judge of the facts."), with THOMAS A. FLANNERY ET AL., FEDER-
AL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 19 (1988):
While we were hearing evidence you were told that the government and the de-
fendant agreed, or stipulated, that .... There is no disagreement over that, so
there was no need for evidence by either side on that point. You must accept that
as fact, even though nothing more was said about it one way or the other.
The federal courts of appeal disagree as to the appropriateness of a "binding" instruc-
tion when the defense has stipulated to an element of a crime. See United States v.
Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 945 (1997) (discussing a circuit split in which the Fourth Cir-
cuit has held that a defendant retains the right to have the element proved and the gov-
ernment retains the duty to prove the issue to the jury, and in which the Tenth Circuit
has held that stipulation waives the right to proof and the duty to charge the jury).
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conviction but also his acceptance of a "binding" instruction to the jury on
the issue. Because this constituted only a functional equivalent of a plead-
ing, not a formal one, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which limits a criminal defendant to pleas of not guilty, guilty, and nolo
contendere, and abolishes other pleas, may be met.'53
The potential of a defendant's strategy to alter the normal limitations on
the defendant's pleadings, with consequences on the scope and force of the
evidence at trial, is apparent. Even a binding instruction is unenforceable in
a criminal case if the jury chooses to disregard it and acquits the accused.
Accordingly, Wigmore's evaluation and suggestion seem sensible:
Nevertheless, a colorless admission by the opponent may
sometimes have the effect of depriving the party of the legit-
imate moral force of his evidence; furthermore, a judicial
admission may be cleverly made with grudging limitations or
evasions or insinuations (especially in criminal cases), so as
to be technically but not practically a waiver of proof.
Hence, there should be no absolute rule on the subject; and
the trial court's discretion should determine whether a partic-
ular admission is so plenary as to render the first party's
evidence wholly needless under the circumstances.'54
IX. WHAT DOES OLD CHIEF MEAN?
It is rare that much meaning can be confidently ascribed to a new depar-
ture in what may or may not become a body of precedent. The decision in
Old Chief presents such a quandary. Among the possibilities are the follow-
ing, beginning with the most limited and proceeding to the more expansive.
A. Defensive offers to stipulate ex-felon status and submit to binding in-
structions in firearm prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) must be accept-
ed by the prosecution. The prosecution may not refuse the offer and instead
use a judgment showing a prior violent felony. In other situations, the pros-
ecution generally is entitled to prove its case despite a defendant's conces-
sion or offer to stipulate. This interpretation is consistent with the facts of
Old Chief and with the vacating of broader court of appeals rulings in
Crowder and Davis. It also is consistent with the opinion of the Court:
"While our discussion has been general because of the general wording of
Rule 403, our holding is limited to cases involving proof of felon sta-
tus."'
55
153 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(a).
154 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2591, at 824-25
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1981).
155 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.7; United States v. Crowder, No. 92-3133 (D.C.
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B. Old Chief requires similar limitations on government proof of the
status element of other offenses. In Old Chief, the Court treated the status
element as being distinct from other elements of the offense.
This recognition that the prosecution with its burden of per-
suasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story
has, however, virtually no application when the point at issue
is a defendant's legal status, dependent on some judgment
rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later
criminal behavior charged against him.'56
Note, however, that if the proof of the judgment were to reveal a prior felo-
ny relevant to the establishment of the new offense in addition to showing
ex-felon status, the prosecution would still be free to introduce it.' This
interpretation also is consistent with the vacation of the more unrestrained
judgments of the court of appeals in Crowder and Davis."'
C. The Court has embarked upon the task of developing a common law
of required acceptance of defensive stipulations or admissions in criminal,
and perhaps civil, cases. It may also be commencing a judicial gloss that
directs the exercise of Rule 403 power in other situations. The reversal of
the judgment in Old Chief is a rejection of complete trial court discretion in
declining to exclude prejudicial evidence under Rule 403, despite the per-
missive literal language of the rule. It may encourage further development
of more specific rules, standards, and principles, in addition to those set
Cir. May 1, 1998) (en banc) (LEXIS, Genfed library, 8345); see also United States v.
Ortiz, 125 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding a photograph of a group of alledged drug
traffickers was admissible notwithstanding the defense's offer to stipulate as to their
relationship); People v. Scheid, 939 P.2d 748, 757 (1997) (holding that in a felony
murder trial, a defense offer to stipulate as to the fact or manner of shootings did not
preclude the admissibility of a grisly photograph of the victims, given the need of the
prosecution to tell "a colorful story with descriptive richness") (quoting Old Chief, 117
S. Ct. at 653).
156 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654-55.
157 The Court cited Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits the
introduction of uncharged offenses to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Id. at 655 (quoting FED.
R. EVID. 404(b)).
158 A large number of federal crimes have what may be termed "status" elements,
often as the basis for federal jurisdiction. Illustrative is federal officer or employee
status, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (bribery of public officials and witnesses); id.
§ 205 (federal officers and employees acting as agent in filing a claim against the Unit-
ed States); id. § 207 (conflicts of interest); and status of things, such as that relating to
the commerce power, see, e.g., id § 1201 (kidnapping); id. § 2421 (transportation for
illegal sexual activities); id. § 1962 (racketeering activity). The risk of unfair prejudice
rarely will be present in most of these situations.
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forth in the other parts of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to guide federal
trial courts in exercising their Rule 403 power.
In United States v. Cottman,159 a false statement prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 1001, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court in Old Chief in support of its decision to uphold a
district court's decision not to require the prosecution to accept a stipulation
offered by the defendant as to all elements of the charge other than the
materiality of the false statement. In reaching its decision, the appellate
court stated that the latter issue could not be adequately understood by the
jury without the other evidence that the defendant sought to preclude from
trial."6 At the same time, the court did not repudiate its own cases requir-
ing the acceptance of stipulations in other non-status situations, stating that
the evidence properly precluded was of events unrelated to the crime
charged. 6 The opinion in Cottman was ordered not to be cited in other
cases and may have reflected a desire to postpone reconsideration of prior
cases in the circuit, 62 which gave defendants greater authority to compel
acceptance of proffers of stipulations than does the dicta in Old Chief The
effect is to begin a case law defining, beyond the status element of some
crimes, those stipulations that must be accepted as well as those that need
not be.
D. The Court, in effect, has introduced civil defensive pleading into
federal criminal litigation. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "[a] party shall ... admit or deny the averments upon which
the adverse party relies." 6 ' The privilege against self-incrimination doubt-
lessly precludes requiring a defendant to so respond in a criminal case, but,
if he so chooses, arguably Rule 403 empowers him to do so and to foreclose
damaging prosecution evidence that otherwise would be admissible. While
this is a possible interpretation of the reversal in Old Chief, it is inconsistent
with its text, as well as with the decisions in Crowder and Davis, which
vacated court of appeals rulings that would have had such effect.
An alternative argument for importing civil-type pleading into criminal
litigation is a constitutional one: Failure to force the prosecution to accept a
defendant's concession or offer to stipulate may constitute a denial of equal
protection of the laws, given the ability of civil case defendants to preclude
159 116 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 1997). This unpublished opinion may be found in No. 96-
1774, 1997 WL 340344 (2d Cir. June 20, 1997).
o See id. at *4.
161 See id. at *5.
162 See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that evidence
of prior crimes was inadmissible because the intent of the defendant was not at issue);
United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the government may
not refuse an unequivical offer to stipulate to a defendant's intent and knowledge in
order to introduce evidence of other crimes).
163 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
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damaging proof by concessions in the pleadings." This is the thesis of
Professor Edward Imwinkelried, who candidly has conceded that prevailing
law does not require the prosecution to accept such a concession.'65 The
decisions in Old Chief, Crowder, and Davis, while based on an interpreta-
tion of nonconstitutional rules of evidence, a fortiori do not support such a
constitutional claim. The higher burdens of proof," the limitations in
criminal but not civil cases on the use of evidence obtained by illegal
searches and seizures,'67 the immunity of the defendant from compulsory
testimony, 6 ' the larger federal jury trial right,'69 the protections against
double jeopardy, 70 and the trier of fact's obvious awareness of the great
human cost to the defendant of being convicted, even if guilty, 7' all mili-
'" Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried so argues. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Right to "Plead Out" Issues and Block the Admission of Prejudicial Evidence: The
Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the Criminal Accused as a Denial of Equal
Protection, 40 EMORY L.J. 341 (1991).
165 See id. at 344 (citing 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 80, § 5194, at 198.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-68 (1978) (holding that due process re-
quires the standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal and quasi-crimi-
nal prosecutions).
167 Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained by illegal searches and seizures is required in state criminal cases), and
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that, in federal criminal cases,
evidence obtained by an illegal search must be excluded), with United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence was not re-
quired in a civil tax case).
' See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding
that it is a violation of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination for a prosecu-
tor to comment to the jury on a defendant's failure to take the witness stand).
169 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (extend-
ing to the states a defendant's right to trial by jury in non-petty criminal cases). In
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 Ui.S. 510, 513 (1983), the Court held an instruction that
"[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts" violated due process in that it risked being interpreted as a direction of a verdict
on the issue of intent. While the Seventh Amendment recognizes a jury trial right in
some civil cases ("[s]uits at common law"), it has not been extended to the states. See
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Directed verdicts (now termed judgments as a matter of law
under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) are conventionally allowed in
civil cases.
17 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that setting aside an ac-
quittal infected with constitutional error and conducting a new trial violated double
jeopardy, and applying the double jeopardy prohibition to state criminal trials).
171 See Nesson, supra note 116, at 1364:
Both civil and criminal instructions speak to how jurors should feel after the ver-
dict. The criminal instruction says, in effect, "Recognize that you are dealing with
a person's life and liberty, and decide he is guilty only if you are confident that
you will not be nagged by doubts about the propriety of your decision. Make a
decision you can live with."
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tate in favor of allowing the prosecution in a criminal case to put on a com-
plete account of the crime charged.
E. Old Chief may portend constitutional restrictions on the introduction
of unnecessary emotionally laden prosecution evidence in state as well as
federal cases. Although the holding of the Court was a narrow one, the
balancing analysis under Rule 403 is not dissimilar to procedural due pro-
cess analysis of whether fundamental fairness has been satisfied.
McCormick has suggested that "[t]here are intimations that the rule [exclud-
ing evidence of defendants' bad character] has constitional overtones as
applied to criminal defendants."' 72 Although the cases cited contain lan-
guage defending such concepts as the "presumption of innocence.7 . and
the precept that "a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he
is," 4 they do not constitute holdings based on the Constitution. On the
other hand, in McGuire v. Estelle,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a district court decision denying habeas relief to a California state
court murder defendant. The state trial judge had admitted evidence of prior
injuries to the infant victim while in the care of the defendant and her moth-
er.'7 6 The court of appeals concluded that the evidence that the defendant
had caused this abuse was insufficient to permit its consideration by the jury
consistent with due process, which also was violated by a related instruc-
tion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the alleged er-
rors rose to the level of constituting a due process violation, and cautioned
that federal habeas relief was not available for violation of state evidentiary
law.'78 Old Chief, however, may lead state courts to make similiar rulings
as a matter of their own law.
'72 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 76, § 190, at 797 n.1.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding
that "the exclusion of other crimes evidence ... gives meaning to the central precept of
our system of criminal justice, the presumption of innocence"); Government of the
Virgin Is. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that the prosecution's
evidence of other crimes undermined the defendant's presumption of innocence).
174 United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A concomitant of
the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for
who he is."); cf State v. Manrique, 531 P.2d 239, 241 (Or. 1975) (" [A] person accused
of [a] crime has a constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against
him and to be held to answer only the crime named in the indictment.").
175 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
176 See McGuire, 502 U.S. at 65.
177 See id. at 66-67.
178 See id. at 67. Lower federal courts occasionally continue to confuse their role as
appliers of federal law in federal trials with their limited constitutional authority to
review state court convictions. See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Keane, 972 F. Supp. 709
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that identification evidence, including the lack of a caution-
ary instruction, denied the accused due process and warranted habeas relief).
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X. CONCLUSION
The decision in Old Chief appears to be a relatively conservative one.
While the conviction was upset, the rationale could hardly have been more
cautious. Far more sweeping change could have been effected by declaring
the defendant's status as a convicted felon irrelevant on the theory that fol-
lowing his concession, that fact was no longer in issue and hence not "of
consequence to the determination of the action" under the definition of rele-
vancy in Rule 401.'79 The judgment of conviction would then be inadmis-
sible under Rule 402,8' without embarking on the vagaries of balancing
under Rule 403."8 This interpretation of relevancy would be permissible
within the text of Rule 40112 Although the Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 401 is to the contrary, the Committee's language could be disregard-
ed as not controlling and as inconsistent with a literal reading of the
text.i"3 Although less sweeping in its implications, a similar analysis could
have been developed under the balancing test of Rule 403, with the "proba-
tive value" of such evidence summarily discounted, and the tendency to
create "unfair prejudice" emphasized. Both of these approaches would en-
courage parties to "plead out" the weaker aspects of their criminal and civil
cases. Instead, the Court emphasized the government's need for descriptive
179 See FED. R. EVID. 401.
0 Rule 402 states that only relevant evidence is admissible. See id. 402.
"' See id. 403 (setting forth the "probative value" versus "unfair prejudice" consider-
ation).
18 See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
186 (7th ed. 1998) ("In our view, the wording 'fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action' requires that all proof be directed to the issues in dispute."); see
also 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
404[09], at 404-51-52 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1st ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted):
Evidence directed to a category other than propensity is not, however admissible
unless this issue is actually being controverted. This is simply a specialized appli-
cation of the usual rule that evidence must be probative of a fact that is of conse-
quence, that is to say material, to an action in order to be relevant.
183 See FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee's Note. The same committee note
indicates that the language of 401 "is that of California Evidence Code § 210." Id.
However, the California Evidence Code defines relevant evidence as "having any ten-
dency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action." CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1995) (emphasis added)
(originally enacted in current form as Cobey-Song Evidence Act, 1965 Cal. Stat. 299
§ 210). The advisory committee removed "disputed" from the proposed Federal Rule.
This change is unlikely to have been meaningful to Congress when the Federal Rules
were adopted. Congress accepted Rule 401 as proposed. The hearings brought forth no
criticism of the rule, and it was not the subject of debate on the floor of either house.
See 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 95, § 4.01 App.01[3].
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richness and narrative completeness in placing cases before juries, which
could be expected to engage in nonlinear reasoning.
These implications from the Court's opinion in Old Chief are signifi-
cantly strengthened by the vacations and remands in Crowder and Davis. If
those decisions had been affirmed, litigants could stipulate around disadvan-
tageous aspects of their cases. Trials presumably would be somewhat short-
er, but in our imperfect world it is unlikely that they would be more fair.
Still, Old Chief clearly means that trial judges do not have unlimited discre-
tion to decline to exclude evidence under Rule 403. The extent of this limi-
tation on discretion, however, must await the clarification of further deci-
sions.
